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Gossip-based protocols have proven very efﬁcient for disseminating high-bandwidth con-
tent such as video streams in a peer-to-peer fashion. However, for the protocols to work,
nodes are required to collaborate by devoting a fraction of their upload bandwidth, a scarce
resource for some of them, to forward the content they receive to other nodes. Conse-
quently, such protocols suffer from freeriding, a common phenomenon on the Internet,
which consists in selﬁshly beneﬁting from the system without contributing its fair share.
Due to the dynamic nature and the inherent randomness of gossip protocols and to the
high scalability requirements of video streaming systems, detecting freeriders is a difﬁcult
challenge.
This paper presents LiFTinG, the ﬁrst protocol for detecting freeriders, including collud-
ing ones, in gossip-based content dissemination systems with asymmetric data exchanges.
In addition, LiFTinG is still able to detect freeriders when network coding, a widely used
technique to improve the efﬁciency of content dissemination, is used. LiFTinG relies on
nodes to track abnormal behavior by cross-checking the history of their previous interac-
tions and exploits the fact that nodes pick neighbors at random to prevent colluding nodes
from mutually covering up their bad actions.
We present a methodology for setting the parameters of LiFTinG to their optimal value,
based on a theoretical analysis and we quantify theoretically the performance of LiFTinG.
We derive, based on simulations, the optimal strategy of freeriders by taking into account,
through a utility function, the beneﬁt of freeriding and the probability of being detected. In
addition to these simulations, we report on the deployment of LiFTinG on PlanetLab. In a
300-node system, where a stream of 674 kbps is broadcasted, LiFTinG incurs a maximumdleware
marrec),
y funded
4 Throughout the paper, asymmetry refers to the
that nodes push content without expecting any conten
heterogeneity of the nodes’ capabilities. See [15] for
topic.
R. Guerraoui et al. / Computer Networks 64 (2014) 322–338 323overhead of only 8% and provides good detection results: For instance, with 10% of freerid-
ers decreasing their contribution by up to 30%, LiFTinG detects 86% of the freeriders after
only 30 s and wrongfully expels only a few honest nodes (most of them actually being
buggy).
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Gossip protocols have been successfully applied to
decentralize large-scale high-bandwidth content dissemi-
nation, such as video streaming [12,14,15]. Such systems
are asymmetric4: nodes propose packet identiﬁers to a
dynamically changing subset of random nodes. Packets can
be either chunks of the ﬁle or stream, or combinations of
such chunks when coding is used (e.g., random linear com-
binations in [23,56,9]). These nodes, in turn, request packets
of interest, that are subsequently pushed by the proposer. In
such a three-phase protocol, gossip is used to disseminate
content location, whereas the content itself is explicitly
requested and served, in order to avoid serving redundant
content. These protocols are commonly used for high-
bandwidth content dissemination with gossip, e.g.,
[15,14,36,12] (a similar scheme is also present in mesh-
based systems, e.g., [35,59,55,58,39] – see [60] for a compre-
hensive survey of peer-to-peer live streaming protocols).
The efﬁciency of such protocols highly relies on the
willingness of participants to collaborate, i.e., to devote a
fraction of their resources, namely their upload bandwidth,
to the system. Yet, some of these participants might be
tempted to freeride [34,25,3], i.e., not contribute their fair
share of work, especially if they could still beneﬁt from
the system. Freeriding is common in large-scale systems
deployed in the public domain [1] and signiﬁcantly de-
grades the overall performance in bandwidth-demanding
and delay-sensitive applications such as streaming. In
addition, freeriders might collude (e.g., as evidenced in
the Maze peer-to-peer sharing system [37]), i.e., collabo-
rate to decrease their individual contribution and the con-
tribution of the coalition and mutually cover up their
misbehaviors to circumvent detection mechanisms.
Although gossip protocols are almost not affected by
crashes [31,13], high-bandwidth content dissemination
with gossip clearly suffers more from freeriders than from
crashes. Indeed, when content is pushed in a single phase,
a freerider is equivalent to a crashed node (if TCP, or a sim-
ilar ﬂow control protocol, is not used). Both crashed nodes
and freeriders consume bandwidth (as content is pushed
to them) and they do not provide upload bandwidth. In
three-phase protocols, however, crashed nodes do not pro-
vide upload bandwidth anymore, nor do they consume
bandwidth, as they do not request content from proposers
after they crash. On the contrary, freeriders decrease their
contribution, yet keep requesting content.protocol, i.e., the fact
t in return, not to the
a study on this latterA widely used solution to counter freeriding is to use
Tit-for-Tat (TfT) incentives (inspired by the BitTorrent
[10] ﬁle-sharing system): TfT-based content dissemination
solutions (e.g., FlightPath [36]) make nodes contribute as
much as they beneﬁt by enforcing balanced symmetric ex-
changes. However, so-called symmetric systems do not
perform as well as asymmetric systems in terms of efﬁ-
ciency and scalability for live streaming [5].
In practice, many proposals (e.g., [12,35,55,59]) con-
sider, instead of symmetric exchanges, asymmetric ex-
changes where nodes are supposed to altruistically serve
content to other nodes, i.e., without asking anything in re-
turn, where the beneﬁt of a node is not directly correlated
to its contribution but rather to the global health of the sys-
tem. The correlation between the beneﬁt and the contribu-
tion is not immediate. However, such correlation can be
artiﬁcially established, in a punitive way, by means of ver-
iﬁcation mechanisms that ensure that nodes that do not
contribute their fair share do not beneﬁt anymore from
the system. Freeriders are by deﬁnition rational proﬁt-
maximizing entities. Therefore, in the presence of punitive
mechanisms, they can then be deﬁned as nodes that de-
crease their contribution as much as possible while keep-
ing the probability of being expelled low.
In this work, we consider a generic three-phase gossip
protocol where data is disseminated following an asym-
metric push scheme. Data can be transmitted in a coded
form, more speciﬁcally, random linear combinations [23].
In this context, we propose LiFTinG, a lightweight mecha-
nism to track freeriders. To the best of our knowledge,
LiFTinG is the ﬁrst protocol for securing asymmetric gossip
protocols (even when coding is used) against possibly col-
luding freeriders. At the core of LiFTinG lies a set of deter-
ministic and randomized distributed veriﬁcation
procedures based on accountability (i.e., each node main-
tains a digest of its past interactions). Deterministic proce-
dures check, by cross-checking nodes’ logs, that the
content received by a node is actually further propagated
following the protocol (i.e., to the right number of nodes
within an acceptable delay). By using statistical tech-
niques, randomized procedures check that the interactions
of a node are evenly distributed in the system. Interest-
ingly enough, the strong randomness and the high dynam-
ics of gossip protocols, which might be considered at ﬁrst
glance as a barrier to properly monitor nodes, happens to
help in tracking freeriders. Indeed, LiFTinG exploits the
very fact that nodes pick neighbors at random to prevent
collusion: As a node interacts with a large subset of the
nodes chosen at random, this drastically limits its opportu-
nity to freeride without being detected, because this pre-
vents it from deterministically choosing colluding
partners that would cover it up.
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including scalability, bandwidth usage, and performance of
detection in the presence of message losses and untruthful
reports from nodes. LiFTinG is scalable and lightweight as
it relies neither on a (trusted) central authority (e.g., PKI,
reputation server) nor on heavyweight cryptography and
incurs only very low overhead in terms of bandwidth. In
addition, LiFTinG is fully decentralized as nodes are in
charge of verifying each others’ actions. Finally, LiFTinG
provides a good probability of detecting freeriders and
keeps low the probability of false positives, i.e., inaccu-
rately classifying a correct node as a freerider, by using
mechanisms which, based on the results of our analytical
analysis, (i) de-incentivize nodes from reporting wrongful
accusations against other nodes and (ii) compensate the
effect of message losses.
We give analytical results backed up with simulations
that provide means to set the parameters of LiFTinG in a
real environment. Moreover, our theoretical results can
be used as input for a game-theoretical study of the system
because they provide expressions (or bounds) of the key
performance metrics including the probability of detection,
the false positive rate, and the expected beneﬁt. In
addition, we deployed LiFTinG over PlanetLab, where a
stream of 674 kbps is broadcast to 300 PlanetLab nodes
with their upload bandwidth capped at 1000 kbps for
increased realism, and we report on LiFTinG’s performance
in practice. In order to illustrate the importance of counter-
ing freeriders and the performance of LiFTinG, consider the
following high-level experimental results: In the presence
of freeriders, the health of the system (i.e., the proportion
of nodes able to receive the stream in function of the
stream lag, i.e., cumulative distribution function) degrades
signiﬁcantly, compared to a system where all nodes follow
the protocol. Fig. 1 shows a clear drop between the plain
line (no freeriders) and the dashed line (25% of freeriders).
With LiFTinG, and assuming that freeriders keep their
probability of being expelled lower than 50%, the perfor-
mance is close to the baseline.
In this setting, LiFTinG incurs a maximum network
overhead of only 8%. When freeriders decrease their
contribution by 30%, LiFTinG detects 86% of the freeriders
and wrongly expels 12% of honest nodes, after only 30 s.
Most of the wrongly expelled nodes deserve it, in a sense,Fig. 1. System efﬁciency in the presence of freeriders.as their actual contribution is smaller than required. How-
ever, this is due to poor capabilities, as opposed to freerid-
ers that deliberately decrease their contribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes our illustrative gossip protocol and Section 3 lists and
classiﬁes theopportunities fornodes to freeride insuchacon-
tent-dissemination protocol. Section 4 presents LiFTinG and
Section 5 formally analyzes its performance backed up by
extensive simulations. Section 6 reports on the deployment
of LiFTinG over the PlanetLab testbed. Section 7 reviews re-
lated work. Section 8 concludes the paper.2. Model and gossip protocol
We consider a system of n nodes that communicate
over lossy links (e.g., UDP) and that can receive incoming
data from any other node in the system. More speciﬁcally,
the nodes that are behind a NAT or a ﬁrewall make use of
the Internet Gateway Device Protocol (through Universal
Plug‘n’Play) to dynamically add translation rules at the
router or implement UDP NAT traversal techniques (‘‘hole
punching’’) such as STUN [48]. Relay-based techniques
can also be used [32]). In addition, nodes can pick uni-
formly at random a set of nodes in the system. This is
achieved by using full membership (i.e., the nodes know
the list of all other nodes in the system) or a random peer
sampling protocol, e.g., [33,27]. Such sampling protocols
can be made robust to byzantine attacks by using tech-
niques such as Brahms [6]. Indeed, a node might be
tempted to tamper with the peer sampling service in order
to be chosen, and thus served content, more frequently by
other nodes.
A source broadcasts a data stream to all nodes by using
a three-phase gossip protocol (e.g., [14,12]). The content is
split into multiple chunks uniquely identiﬁed by IDs. In
short, each node periodically proposes a set of chunks it re-
ceives to a set of random nodes. Upon reception of a pro-
posal, a node requests the chunks it needs–essentially
those it does not have already–and the sender then serves
them. All messages are sent over UDP. The three phases are
illustrated in Fig. 2(b).
2.1. Proposal phase
A node periodically, i.e., at every gossip period Tg , picks
uniformly at random a set of f nodes and proposes to them
(as depicted in Fig. 2(a)) the set P of chunks it has received
since its last propose phase. The size f of the node set,
namely the fan-out, is the same for all nodes and kept con-
stant over time (the fan-out is typically set to a value
slightly larger than lnðnÞ [31], that is f ¼ 12 for a 10,000-
node system). Such a gossip protocol follows an infect-
and-die process, as once a node proposes a chunk to a set
of nodes, it does not propose it anymore.
2.2. Request phase
Upon reception of a proposal of a set P of chunks, a
node determines the subset of chunks R it needs and re-
quests these chunks.
Fig. 2. Three-phase generic gossip.
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When a proposing node receives a request correspond-
ing to a proposal, it serves the chunks requested. If a re-
quest does not correspond to a proposal, it is ignored.
Similarly, nodes only serve chunks that are effectively pro-
posed, i.e., chunks in P \R.
2.4. Network coding
To increase the efﬁciency of the dissemination, coding
techniques can be used: by proposing combinations of
chunks instead of proposing chunks, the probability of pro-
posing, and thus of pushing, useful content increases. For
instance, random linear network coding [23] was success-
fully used in Avalanche [18], in SPANC [9], and in R2 [56].
When random linear network coding is used, nodes pro-
pose linear combinations (i.e., bitwise XORs) of the chunks
they receive during the last period. A node proposes one
linear combination for each chunk it received over the last
gossip period to each of the f nodes it contacts. The coefﬁ-
cients of the combination are picked at random from a
Galois ﬁeld GFð2qÞ. To propose a linear combination of
chunks, a node sends a set of pairs (ID,coefﬁcient) instead
of a single ID. For instance, to propose the combination
2  c3  c5, a nodes sends fð3;2Þ; ð5;1Þg. To ensure an opti-
mal utility of the proposed combinations, the proposer
makes sure they are linearly independent. Checking linear
independence and decoding the original data chunks of the
stream are achieved through Gauss elimination. For the re-
ceiver, the packets of interest are those that are linearly
independent with the packets it has received so far. The
receiver requests only such packets from the proposer.3. The freeriding problem
Nodes are either honest or freeriders; we denote by m
the number of freeriders. Honest nodes strictly follow the
protocol, including the veriﬁcation procedures speciﬁed
in LiFTinG. Freeriders, however, allow themselves to devi-
ate from the protocol in order to minimize their contribu-
tion while maximizing their utility. In addition, freeriders
can adopt any behavior in order to not be expelled, includ-
ing lying to veriﬁcations, or covering up colluding freerid-
ers’ bad actions. More generally, freeriders are rational
entities: They behave in such a way that their utility ismaximized; their utility being a decreasing function of
their upload bandwidth usage and an increasing function
of the quality of the stream they receive. Note that in our
model, we assume that freeriders do not wrongfully accuse
(honest) nodes (In [7], the authors propose techniques to
deal with such accusations). This is motivated by the fact
that causing honest nodes to be expelled (i) does not in-
crease the beneﬁt of freeriders, (ii) does not prevent them
from being detected, i.e., detection is based solely on the
suspected node’s behavior regardless of other nodes’
behaviors (details in Section 5.1), and ﬁnally (iii) leads to
an increased proportion of freeriders, degrading the beneﬁt
of all nodes (including freeriders). This phenomenon is
known as the tragedy of the commons [21]. Note that there
are still some advantages for freeriders to wrongfully ac-
cuse other nodes, e.g., discredit the entire reputation sys-
tem. Existing solutions can be used to mitigate the effect
of such dishonest behaviors. For instance, it can be en-
forced that nodes accuse only the nodes they interact with.
In addition, one can limit the number of nodes a node can
accuse (per minute); this would have a limited effect on
legitimate accusations provided that the proportion of
freeriders remains low. Other existing solutions (e.g.,
[40], see [24] for a comprehensive survey) propose to mod-
ulate accusations by the credibility/trustworthiness (which
can be the reputation of the node itself) of the accusing
node. More complex solutions can be used; for instance
in SumUp [54], the nodes propagate their accusations
(i.e., votes in the original version) along the edges of a so-
cial network in order to mitigate the effect of a coalition of
related nodes that try to jointly wrongfully accuse other
nodes. Such solutions however, often require some infra-
structure and extra information which do not match the
requirements of LiFTinG in terms of decentralization, scala-
bility and reactivity.
Freeriders deviate from the gossip protocol in the fol-
lowing ways: (i) decrease the number of partners to com-
municate with, (ii) bias the partner selection, (iii) drop
messages they are supposed to send, or (iv) modify the
content of the messages they send. In the following sec-
tion, we provide an exhaustive list of all possible attacks
in each phase of the protocol, we discuss their motivations
and effects, and then we extract and classify those that can
increase the individual utility of a freerider or the common
utility of colluding freeriders. Throughout the paper, the
attacks that require collusion between some nodes or prof-
it to colluding nodes are denoted with a ‘H’.
Proposal phase During the ﬁrst phase, a freerider can (i)
communicate with less than f nodes, (ii) propose less
chunks than it should (less linear combinations, or linear
combinations of less received packets when network
coding is used), (iii) select as communication partners only
a speciﬁc subset of nodes, and (iv) reduce its proposing
rate.
1. Decreasing fan-out: By proposing chunks to f^ < f
nodes per gossip period, the freerider trivially reduces
the potential number of requests and thus the probabil-
ity of serving chunks. Therefore, its contribution in
terms of the amount of data uploaded is decreased
and its utility increases.
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chunk received in the last gossip period. Proposing only
a subset of the chunks received in the last period obvi-
ously decreases the number of requested chunks. How-
ever, a freerider has no interest in proposing chunks it
does not have as, unlike with TfT-based protocols,
uploading chunks to a node does not imply that it sends
chunks in return. In other words, proposing more (and
possibly fake) chunks does not increase the beneﬁt of
a node and thus does not need to be considered.
3. Biasing the partners selection (H): Considering a
group of colluding nodes, a freerider might want to bias
the random selection of nodes to favor its colluding
partners, so that the group’s beneﬁt increases.
4. Increasing the gossip period: A freerider can increase
its gossip period, leading to less frequent proposals
advertising more, but ‘‘older’’, chunks per proposal. This
implies a decreased interest of the requesting nodes
and thus a decreased contribution for the sender. This
is due to the fact that an old chunk has a lower proba-
bility of being of interest as it becomes more replicated
over time.
3.1. Pull-request phase
Nodes are expected to request only chunks that have
been proposed to them. A freerider would increase its ben-
eﬁt by opportunistically requesting extra chunks (even
from nodes that did not propose these chunks). The dis-
semination protocol itself prevents this misbehavior by
automatically dropping such requests.3.2. Serving phase
In the serving phase, freeriders can (i) send only a sub-
set of what was requested or (ii) send junk. The ﬁrst obvi-
ously decreases the freeriders’ contribution, as they serve
fewer chunks than they are supposed to. However, as we
mentioned above, in the considered asymmetric protocol,
a freerider has no interest in sending junk data, because
it does not receive anything in return for what it sends.3.3. Summary
Analyzing the basic gossip protocol in detail enables us
to identify the possible attacks. Interestingly enough, these
attacks share similar aspects and can thus be gathered into
three classes that dictate the rationale along which our
veriﬁcation procedures are designed.
The ﬁrst is quantitative correctness that characterizes the
fact that a node effectively proposes to the correct number
of nodes (f) at the correct rate (1=Tg). Assuming this ﬁrst
aspect is veriﬁed, two more aspects must be further con-
sidered: causality that reﬂects the correctness of the deter-
ministic part of the protocol, i.e., received chunks must be
proposed in the next gossip period (as depicted in
Fig. 2(b)); and statistical validity that evaluates the fairness
(with respect to the distribution speciﬁed by the protocol)
in the random selection of communication partners.4. Tracking freeriders in gossip
To address the problem of freeriders in epidemic proto-
cols, we propose LiFTinG, a lightweight protocol for freerid-
er tracking in gossip, that encourages nodes, in a dissuasive
way, to contribute their fair share to the system, by means
of distributed veriﬁcations. LiFTinG consists of (i) direct
veriﬁcations and (ii) a posteriori veriﬁcations. Veriﬁcations,
that require more information than what is available at the
verifying node and the inspected node, are referred to as
cross-checking. This essentially consists in several nodes
grouping together their information to effectively detect
misbehaviors (that were committed by the inspected
node) that could not be detected solely based on the infor-
mation they hold individually. Cross-checking requires
nodes to communicate and therefore incurs communica-
tion overhead. In order to control the overhead of LiFTinG,
the frequency at which such veriﬁcations are triggered is
controlled by a parameter pcc 2 ½0;1, as described in Sec-
tion 4.2. Veriﬁcations can either lead to the emission of
blames or directly to expulsion, depending on the gravity
of the misbehavior.
Direct veriﬁcations are performed regularly while the
protocol is running: the nodes’ actions are directly
checked. Direct veriﬁcations aim at checking that all
chunks requested are served and that all chunks served
are further proposed to a correct number of nodes, i.e, they
check the quantitative correctness and causality. Direct ver-
iﬁcations are composed of (i) direct checking and (ii) direct
cross-checking.
A posteriori veriﬁcations are run sporadically. They re-
quire each node to maintain a log of its past interactions,
namely a history. In practice, a node stores a digest of the
events that occurred in the last h seconds (i.e., a sliding
window), corresponding to the last nh ¼ h=Tg gossip peri-
ods. The history is audited to check the statistical validity
of the random choices made when selecting communica-
tion partners. In LiFTinG, an entropic check is used as de-
scribed in Section 4.4. The veracity of the history is
veriﬁed by cross-checking the involved nodes, namely a
posteriori cross-checking.
We present the blaming architecture in Section 4.1 and
present direct veriﬁcations in Section 4.2. As freeriders can
collude to not be detected, we expose how they can cover
up each other’s misbehaviors in Section 4.3 and address
this breach in Section 4.4. The different attacks and corre-
sponding veriﬁcations are summarized in Table 1.4.1. System architecture
In LiFTinG, the detection of freeriders is achieved by
means of a score assigned to each node. When a node de-
tects that some other node is freeriding, it emits a blame
message containing a blame value (i.e., essentially a real
number) against the suspected node. Summing up the
blame values of a node results in a score. For scores to be
meaningful, blames emitted by different veriﬁcations
should be comparable and homogeneous. In order to col-
lect blames targeted at a given node and to maintain its
score, each node is monitored by a set of other nodes,
Table 1
Summary of attacks and associated veriﬁcations.
Attack Type Detection
Fan-out decrease (f^ < f ) Quantitative Direct cross-check
Partial propose (P) Causality Direct cross-check
Partial serve ( Sj j < Rj j) Quantitative Direct check
Bias partners selection (H) Entropy Entropic check a pos-
teriori cross-check
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Blame messages about a node are sent to its managers.
When a manager detects that the score of a node p it mon-
itors drops beyond a ﬁxed threshold (the design choice of
using a ﬁxed threshold is explained in Section 5.1), it
spreads – through gossip – a revocation message against
p, thus making the nodes of the system progressively re-
move p from their membership. A general overview of
the architecture of LiFTinG is given in Fig. 3.
The blaming architecture of LiFTinG is built on top of
the AVMON [43] monitoring overlay.5 In AVMON, nodes
are assigned a ﬁxed-size set of M random managers consis-
tent over time, which makes it very appealing in our
setting, speciﬁcally a dynamic peer-to-peer environment
subject to churn with possibly colluding nodes. The fact
that the number M of managers is constant makes the
protocol scalable, as the monitoring load at each node is
independent of the system size. Randomness prevents col-
luding freeriders from covering each other up, and consis-
tency makes long-term blame history at the managers, and
thus long-term follow up, possible. The monitoring rela-
tionship is based on a hash function and can be advertised
in a gossip-fashion by piggybacking node’s monitors in the
view maintenance messages (e.g., exchanges of local views
in the distributed peer-sampling service). Doing so, nodes
quickly discover other nodes’ managers – and are therefore
able to blame the nodes if necessary – even in the pres-
ence of churn. In addition, nodes can locally verify (i.e.,
without the need for extra communication) whether the
node-to-managers mapping is correct by hashing the
nodes’ IP addresses, thus preventing freeriders from
forging fake or colluding managers. If a manager does
not map correctly to a node, a revocation against the
concerned node is sent.4.2. Direct veriﬁcations
In LiFTinG, two direct veriﬁcations are used. The ﬁrst
aims to ensure that every requested chunk is served. It is
called direct check. As detection can be done locally and
thus does not incur any bandwidth overhead, it is always
performed. If some requested chunks are missing, the
requesting node blames the proposing node by f= Rj j
(where R is the set of requested chunks) for each chunk
that has not been delivered.5 Note that other monitoring systems, such as PeerMint which makes use
of a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) to store and maintain node proﬁles or
AlliaTrust [17], could be used.The second veriﬁcation checks that received chunks
are further proposed to f nodes within the next gossip
period. This is achieved by a cross-checking procedure that
works as follows: a node p1 that received a chunk ci from
p0 during the previous gossip period acknowledges to p0
that it proposes ci to a set of f nodes. Then, p0 sends
conﬁrm requests (with probability pcc) to the set of f
nodes to check whether they effectively received a pro-
pose message from p1 containing ci. The f witnesses reply
to p0 with answer messages conﬁrming whether p1’s
acknowledgment to p0.
Fig. 4 depicts the message sequence that composes a di-
rect cross-checking veriﬁcation (with a fan-out of 2 for the
sake of readability). The blaming mechanism works as fol-
lows: (i) if the ack message is not received, the veriﬁer p0
blames the veriﬁed node p1 by f, and (ii) for each missing
or negative answer message, p0 blames p1 by 1. In the case
where network coding is used, the linear combinations a
node sends (more speciﬁcally, the coefﬁcients) are
speciﬁed by the nodes that served it during the last gossip
period, in order to prevent the proposing node frommisbe-
having (e.g., carefully choosing and proposing combina-
tions that are not of interest to the receiver). For
instance, when p0 serves p1, it speciﬁes a set of coefﬁcients
for each packet it serves, e.g., f3;4; . . .g. During the next
gossip period, p1 must propose the following combination:
3 times the ﬁrst packet it received during this gossip
period, plus 4 times the second one (if any), and so on
and so forth. When p0 asks for a conﬁrmation from p2
and p3, it includes the list of packets it served to p1 and
the coefﬁcients it speciﬁed to p1. Then, p2 and p3 can verify
if the combinations proposed by p1 match the
speciﬁcations of p0.
As the veriﬁcation messages (i.e., ack, conﬁrm and con-
ﬁrm responses) for the direct cross-checking are small and
in order to limit the subsequent overhead of LiFTinG, direct
cross-checking is done exclusively with UDP. The blames
corresponding to the different attacks are summarized in
Table 2.
Blames emitted by the direct veriﬁcation procedures of
LiFTinG are summed into a score reﬂecting the nodes’
behaviors. For this reason, blame values must be compara-
ble and homogeneous. This means that two misbehaviors
that reduce a freerider’s contribution by the same amount
should lead to the same value of blame, regardless of the
misbehaviors and the veriﬁcation.
We consider a freerider pf that received c chunks and
wants to reduce its contribution by a factor dð0 6 d 6 1Þ.
To achieve this goal, pf can do one of the following: (i)
propose the c received chunks to only f^ ¼ ð1 dÞ  f
nodes, (ii) propose only a proportion ð1 dÞ of the
chunks it received, or (iii) serve only ð1 dÞ  Rj j of
the Rj j chunks it was requested. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we assume that f^ ; c  d; c=f and d  Rj j are all integers.
The number of veriﬁers, that is, the number of nodes
that served the c chunks to pf is called the fan-in (fin).
On average, we have fin ’ f and each node serves c=f
chunks [16].
We now derive, for each of the three aforementioned
misbehaviors, the blame value emitted by the direct
veriﬁcations.
Fig. 3. Overview of LiFTinG’s architecture and functionning.
Fig. 4. Cross-checking protocol.
Table 2
Summary of attacks and associated blame values.
Attacks Blame values
Fan-out decrease (f^ < f ) f  f^ From each veriﬁer
Partial propose 1 (Per invalid proposal) fromeachveriﬁer
Partial serve ( Sj j < Rj j) f  ð Rj j  Sj jÞ= Rj j from each requester
Fig. 5. Direct cross-checking and attack. Colluding nodes are denoted
with a ‘w’.
328 R. Guerraoui et al. / Computer Networks 64 (2014) 322–338(i) Fan-out decrease (direct cross-check): If pf proposes
all the c chunks to only f^ nodes, it is blamed by 1
by each of the fin veriﬁers, for each of the f  f^ miss-
ing ‘‘propose target’’. This results in a blame value of
fin  ðf  f^ Þ ¼ fin  d  f ’ df 2.
(ii) Partial propose (direct cross-check): If pf proposes
only ð1 dÞ  c chunks to f nodes, it is blamed by f
by each of the nodes that provided at least one of
the missing chunks. A freerider therefore has inter-
est in removing from its proposal those chunks orig-
inating from the smallest subset of nodes. In this
case, its proposal is invalid from the standpoint of
d  fin veriﬁers. This results in a blame value of
d  fin  f ’ d  f 2.
(iii) Partial serve (direct check): If pf serves only
ð1 dÞ  Rj j chunks, it is blamed by f= Rj j for each
of the d  Rj jmissing chunks by each of the f request-
ing nodes. This again results in a blame value of
f  ðf= Rj jÞ  d  Rj j ¼ d  f 2.The blame values emitted by the different direct veriﬁ-
cations are therefore homogeneous and comparable on
average, because all misbehaviors lead to the same amount
of blame for a given degree of freeriding d. Thus, they result
in a consistent and meaningful score when summed up.4.3. Fooling the direct cross-check (H)
When a set of freeriders collude, they lie to veriﬁcations
to mutually cover up their misbehaviors. Consider the sit-
uation depicted in Fig. 5(a), where p1 is a freerider. If p0 col-
ludes with p1, then it will not blame p1, regardless of p2’s
answer. Similarly, if p2 colludes with p1, then it will answer
to p0 that p1 sent a valid proposal, regardless of what p1
sent. Even when neither p0 nor p2 collude with p1; p1 can
still fool the direct cross-checking – thanks to a colluding
third party by implementing a man-in-the-middle attack
as depicted in Fig. 5(b). Indeed, if a node p7 colludes with
p1, then p1 can tell p0 it sent a proposal to p7 and tell p2 that
the chunk originated from p7. Doing this, both p0 and p2
will not detect that p1 sent an invalid proposal. The a
R. Guerraoui et al. / Computer Networks 64 (2014) 322–338 329posteriori veriﬁcations presented in the next section address
this issue.
4.4. A posteriori veriﬁcations
As stated in the analysis of the gossip protocol, the ran-
dom choices made in the partners selection must be
checked. In addition, the example described in the previ-
ous section, where freeriders collude to circumvent direct
cross-checking, highlights the need for statistical veriﬁca-
tion of the nodes’ past communication partners.
The history of a node that biased its partner selection
contains a relatively large proportion of colluding nodes.
If only a small fraction of colluding nodes is present in
the system, they will appear more frequently than
honest nodes in each other’s histories and can therefore
be detected. Technically speaking, the IDs of the nodes
a node communicates with are a sequence of realizations
of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
variables drawn from a uniform distribution (across the
whole set of nodes in the system). Determining if an
observed sequence of node ids is drawn from a given
distribution can be achieved through a statistical good-
ness-of-ﬁt test [52]. Below, we present three variants of
such tests.
Statistical veriﬁcations operate as follow (see Fig. 6):
once in a while, each node picks a random node (e.g., one
of the nodes it manages) and veriﬁes its local history over
the last h seconds. When inspecting the history of p, the
veriﬁer computes the number of occurrences of each node
in the set of proposals sent by p during the last h seconds.
We denote by F h as the multiset of nodes to whom p sent a
proposal during this period (a node could indeed appear
more than once in F h). The distribution ~dh of nodes in F h
characterizes the randomness of the partners selection.
We denote by ~dh;i the number of occurrences of node i
(i 2 f1; . . . ;ng) in F h normalized by the size of F h. Then, a
statistical test is run on the observed distribution.
4.4.1. The Kullback–Leibler divergence
Assessing the similarity of two distributions, i.e., the
distribution ~d of p1’s history and the uniform distribution,
can be achieved with the Kullback–Leibler divergence
[11]. When the reference distribution is the uniform distri-
bution, this comes down to computing the Shannon entro-
py of the observed distribution and to comparing the value
obtained to a threshold c (0 6 c 6 log2ðnhf Þ).
Hð~dhÞ ¼ 
Xnhf
i¼1
~dh;ilog2ð~dh;iÞ ð1ÞFig. 6. Entropic check onThe entropy is maximum when every node of the sys-
tem appears at most once in F h (assuming
n > F hj j ¼ nhf ). In this case, it is equal to log2ðnhf Þ. As the
peer selection service might not be perfect, the threshold
c must be tolerant to a small deviation, with respect to
the uniform distribution to avoid false positives (i.e., honest
nodes being blamed). In fact, entropic and statistical tests
similar to those presented in this section are often used
to assess the quality of random peer sampling algorithms.4.4.2. The v2 and the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test
These tests evaluate the likelihood that an observed
sample is drawn from a speciﬁc distribution (here the uni-
form distribution). This is achieved by computing a func-
tion, namely a statistic, of the observed sample. Under
the hypothesis that the observed sample is indeed drawn
from the speciﬁc distribution, the statistics follows a
well-known distribution. For instance, for the v2 test for
assessing the goodness of ﬁt of the uniform distribution,
the statistic is Fv2 ð~dhÞ ¼
Pnhf
i¼1ð~dh;i  1=nÞ
2
and Fv2 follows
a v2 distribution with nhf  1 degrees of freedom. The
likelihood of the hypothesis is then evaluated by using
the statistics table of the v2 distribution. For the
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, the statistics (see [52]) follows
a Kolmogorov distribution.
For the sake of simplicity, LiFTinG makes use of the
entropic check. Details on how to dimension the threshold
c are given in Section 5.2.
The statistical check must be coupled with an a
posteriori cross-checking veriﬁcation procedure to
guarantee the validity of the inspected node’s history.
Cross-checking is achieved by polling all or a subset of
the nodes mentioned in the history for an acknowledg-
ment. The inspected node is blamed by 1 for each proposal
in its history that is not acknowledged by the alleged
receiver. Hence, an inspected freerider replacing colluding
nodes by honest nodes in its history in order to pass the
entropic check will not be covered by the honest nodes
and will thus be blamed accordingly.
Because of the man-in-the middle attack presented in
Section 4.2, a complementary entropic check is performed
on the multi-set of nodes F0h that asked the nodes in F h for
a conﬁrmation, i.e., direct cross-checking. On the one hand,
for an honest node p0;F0h is composed of the nodes that
sent chunks to p0 – namely its fan-in. On the other hand,
for a freerider pH0 that implemented the man-in-the-middle
attack, the set F0h of pH0 contains a large proportion of col-
luding nodes – the nodes that covered it up for the direct
cross-checking – and thus fails the entropic check. If the
history of the inspected node does not pass the entropicproposals (f ¼ 3).
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the system.
Local-history auditing veriﬁcations are sporadically
performed by the nodes using TCP connections. The rea-
sons for using TCP are that (i) the overhead of establishing
a connection is amortized because local history auditing
happens sporadically and implies transferring a large
amount of data, i.e., proportional to h, and that (ii) local
auditing is very sensitive to message losses as the potential
blame is much larger than for direct veriﬁcations and it can
lead to expulsion from the system.5. Parametrizing LiFTinG
This section provides a methodology to set LiFTinG’s
parameters. With this aim, the performance of LiFTinG,
with respect to detection, is analyzed theoretically. Closed
form expressions of the detection and false positive proba-
bilities as functions of the system parameters are given.
Theoretical results allow the system designer to set the
system parameters, e.g., detection thresholds. The nota-
tions used throughout the section are summarized in
Table 3.
This section is split into three parts. First, the design of
the score-based detection mechanism is presented and
analyzed by taking into account message losses. Second,
the entropy-based detection mechanism is analyzed by
taking into account the underlying peer-sampling service.
Both depend on the degree of freeriding and on the favor-
ing factor, i.e., how freeriders favor colluding partners.
Third, the message complexity of LiFTinG is analyzed, as
a function of the various system parameters, as it consti-
tutes an important factor when choosing the values of
the parameters.5.1. Score-based detection
Because of message losses, all nodes can be wrongfully
blamed, i.e., blamed even though they follow the protocol.Table 3
Summary of principal notations.
Notations Descriptions
n;m Number of nodes/freeriders
jRj Number of chunks requested
f Fan-out
nh Size of history
F h;F0h Multi-set of fan-out/fan-in in history
pdcc Probability to trigger direct cross-checking
pl Probability of message loss (pr ¼ 1 pl)
~b Average value of wrongful blames
rðbÞ Standard deviation of wrongful blames
r Number of gossip periods spent in the system
s Normalized score
D Degree of freeriding (3-uple)
~bðDÞ Average value of blames (freeriders)
rðb0ðdÞÞ Standard deviation of blames (freeriders)
g Detection threshold (blame-based detection)
a Probability of detection (blame-based detection)
b Probability of false positive (blame-based detection)
c Detection threshold (entropy-based detection)In addition, freeriders are blamed for their misbehaviors.
Therefore, the score distribution among the nodes is ex-
pected to be a mixture of two components corresponding
respectively to those of honest nodes and freeriders. In this
setting, likelihood maximization algorithms are tradition-
ally used to decide whether a node is a freerider. Such
algorithms are based on the relative score of the nodes
and are thus not sensitive to wrongful blames. Effectively,
wrongful blames have the same effect on honest nodes and
freeriders.
However, in the presence of freeriders, two problems
arise when using relative score-based detection: (i) freerid-
ers are able to decrease the probability of being detected
by wrongfully blaming honest nodes, and (ii) the score of
a node joining the system is not comparable to those of
the nodes already in the system. For these reasons, in
LiFTinG, the effect of wrongful blames, due to message
losses, is automatically compensated, and detection thus
consists in comparing the nodes’ compensated scores to a
ﬁxed threshold g. In short, when the compensated score
of a node drops below g, the managers of that node broad-
cast a revocation message, thus expelling the node from
the system, by using gossip.
Considering message losses independently drawn from
a Bernoulli distribution of parameter pl (we denote by
pr ¼ 1 pl the probability of reception), we derive a
closed-form expression for the expected value of the
blames applied to honest nodes by direct veriﬁcations
during a given timespan. Periodically increasing all scores
accordingly (i.e., by a value corresponding to the expected
wrongful blames applied to the nodes because of message
loss) leads to an average score of 0 for honest nodes. This
way, the ﬁxed threshold g can be used to distinguish be-
tween honest nodes and freeriders. The value of pr used
to compensate the wrongful blames in LiFTinG is the same
for all the nodes; it is evaluated once for all–or at least at a
low frequency (e.g., every month)–and hard-coded in the
protocol, independently from LiFTinG (e.g., by experimen-
tally evaluating the average message loss rate between
trusted nodes).
5.1.1. Wrongful blames
We now compute the expected value of the wrongful
blames applied to honest nodes by direct veriﬁcations. To
this end, we analyze, for each veriﬁcation, the situations
where message losses can cause wrongful blames, and
we evaluate their average impact. For the sake of the
analysis, we assume that (i) a node receives at least one
chunk during every gossip period (and therefore it will
send proposals during the next gossip period), and (ii) each
node requests a constant number Rj j of chunks for each
proposal it receives. We consider the case where cross-
checking is always performed, i.e., pcc ¼ 1.
5.1.1.1. Direct check (dc). For each requested chunk that has
not been served, the node is blamed by f= Rj j. If the pro-
posal is received but the request is lost (i.e., prð1 prÞ),
the node is blamed by f ((a) in Eq. (2)). Otherwise, when
both the proposal and the request message are received
(i.e., p2r ), the node is blamed by f= Rj j for each of the chunks
lost (i.e., ð1 prÞ Rj j) ((b) in Eq. (2)). The expected blame,
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gossip period, due to message losses is therefore
~bdc ¼ f  prð1 prÞ  f
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{ðaÞ
þ p2r  ð1 prÞ Rj j 
f
Rj j
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{ðbÞ26664
3
7775
¼ prð1 p2r Þ  f 2 ð2Þ5.1.1.2. Direct cross-checking (dcc). On average, a node
receives f proposals during each gossip period. Therefore
a node is subject to f direct cross-checking veriﬁcations
and each veriﬁer asks for a conﬁrmation from the f part-
ners of the inspected node. Let p1 be the inspected node
and p0 a veriﬁer. First, note that p0 veriﬁes p1 only if it
served chunks to p1, which requires that its proposal and
the associated request have been received (i.e., p2r ). If at
least one chunk served by p0 or the ack has been lost
(i.e., 1 pjRjþ1r ), p0 will blame p1 by f regardless of what
happens next, because all the f proposals sent by p1 are
invalid from the standpoint of p0 ((a) in Eq. (3)). Otherwise,
that is, if all the chunks served and the ack have been re-
ceived (i.e., pjRjþ1r ), p0 blames p1 by 1 for each negative or
missing answer from the f partners of p1. This situation
occurs when the proposal sent by p1 to a partner, the
conﬁrm message or the answer is lost (i.e., 1 p3r ) ((b) in
Eq. (3)).
~bcc ¼ f  p2r ½ð1 pjRjþ1r Þ  f
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{ðaÞ
þ f  pjRjþ1r ð1 p3r Þ
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{ðbÞ

¼ p2r ð1 pjRjþ4r Þ  f 2 ð3Þ
From the previous analysis, we obtain a closed-form
expression for the expected value of the blame b applied
to an honest node by direct veriﬁcations due to message
losses:
~b ¼ ~bdc þ ~bcc ¼ prð1þ pr  p2r  pjRjþ5r Þ  f 2: ð4Þ5.1.2. Freeriding blames
The blame value b0, applied to a freerider by direct
veriﬁcations, depends on its degree of freeriding D that
characterizes its deviation from the protocol. Formally,
we deﬁne the degree of freeriding as a 3-uple
D ¼ ðd1; d2; d3Þ;0 6 d1; d2; d3 6 1, so that a freerider con-
tacts only ð1 d1Þ  f nodes per gossip period, proposes
the chunks received from a proportion ð1 d2Þ of the
nodes that served it in the previous gossip period, and
serves ð1 d3Þ  Rj j chunks to each requesting node. With
the same methodology as for ~b, we get:
~b0ðDÞ ¼ ð1 d1Þ  pr 1 p2r ð1 d3Þ
   f 2 þ d2  f 2 þ ð1 d2Þ
 p2r  pjRjþ1r ð1 p3r ð1 d1ÞÞ þ ð1 pjRjþ1r Þ
   f 2 ð5Þ
Note that the gain in terms of the upload bandwidth
saved by a freerider is 1 ð1 d1Þð1 d2Þð1 d3Þ. Follow-
ing the same line of reasoning, a closed-form expression
of the standard deviation rðbÞ (resp. rðb0ðDÞÞ) of b (resp.b0ðDÞ) can be derived. Note that, unlike for the computation
of the expectation, for the standard deviation all the
sources of blame must be considered jointly as they are
not independent (and the standard deviation is therefore
not additive). The analysis thus needs to be more system-
atic than above, that is, building a binary decision tree with
all the messages exchanged during a gossip period (each
branch coding whether the corresponding message was re-
ceived or lost) and counting the total blame for each of the
cases at the leaves.
5.1.3. Scores
In order to enable the use of a ﬁxed threshold g, the
scores are compensated with respect to message losses
and normalized by the number of gossip periods r the node
spent in the system. At the tth gossip period, the score of a
node writes
s ¼ 1
r
Xr
i¼0
ðbti  ~bÞ; ð6Þ
where bi is the value of the blames applied to the node
during the ith gossip period.
Fig. 7 depicts the distribution of compensated and
normalized scores (see Formula 6) in the presence of
1000 freeriders of degree d ¼ d1 ¼ d2 ¼ d3 ¼ 0:1 in a
10,000-node system after r ¼ 50 gossip periods. The mes-
sage loss rate is set to 7%, the fan-out f to 12 and Rj j ¼ 4.
The scores of the nodes were increased by ~b ¼ 72:95,
according to Formula (4). We plot separately the distribu-
tion of scores among honest nodes and freeriders. As
expected, the probability density function (Fig. 7(a)) is split
into two disjoint modes separated by a gap: the lowest
(i.e., left most) mode corresponds to freeriders and the
highest one to honest nodes. We observe that the average
score (dotted line) is close to zero (< 0:01), which means
that the wrongful blames have been successfully
compensated.
5.1.4. Detection
Now, we evaluate the ability of LiFTinG to detect free-
riders (probability of detection a) and the proportion of
honest nodes wrongfully expelled from the system (proba-
bility of false positives b). Fig. 7(b) depicts the cumulative
distribution function of scores and illustrates the notion of
detection and false positives for a given value of the detec-
tion threshold.
From the previous analysis, we obtained expressions of
the expectation and the standard deviation of the blames
applied to honest nodes at each round due to message
losses. Therefore, assuming that the bi are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.), we get E½s ¼ 0 and
rðsÞ ¼ rðbÞ= ﬃﬃrp . Using Bienaymé-Tchebychev’s inequality
we get:
b ¼ P s < gð Þ 6 rðbÞ
2
r  g2 ; aðDÞP 1
rðb0ðDÞÞ2
r  ð~b0ðDÞ  gÞ
2 ð7Þ
In LiFTinG, we set the detection threshold g to 9:75 so
that the probability of false positive is lower than 1%; we
Fig. 7. Distribution of normalized scores in the presence of freeriders
(d ¼ 0:1Þ).
Fig. 8. Proportion of freeriders detected by LiFTinG.
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degree d (i.e., d1 ¼ d2 ¼ d3 ¼ d); and we observe the propor-
tion of freeriders detected by LiFTinG for several values of
d. Fig. 8 plots a as a function of d. We observe that a node
freeriding by 5% is detected with probability 0:65. Beyond
10% of freeriding, a node is detected over 99% of the time.
It is commonly assumed that users are willing to use a
modiﬁed version of the client application only if it in-
creases signiﬁcantly their beneﬁts (resp. decreases their
contribution). In FlightPath [36], this threshold is assumed
to be around 10%. With LiFTinG, a freerider achieves a gain
of 10% for d ¼ 0:035 which corresponds to a probability of
being detected of 50% (Fig. 8).5.1.5. Optimal freeriding strategy
From the previous analysis, we can extract expressions
and bounds of the key factors that affect a node’s utility –
speciﬁcally the probability of detection (a), and the upload
bandwidth savings (1 ð1 d1Þð1 d2Þð1 d3Þ) – as func-
tions of the degree of freeriding. In addition, previous stud-
ies of epidemic high-bandwidth content dissemination
protocols derived expressions of the global health of the
system, which determines the beneﬁts of the nodes (i.e.,
the quality of service), as a function of the contributions
of the nodes (e.g., [5]). The coupling of LiFTinG’s detection
and punishment mechanisms adds a feedback loop fromthe nodes’ behavior to their beneﬁts. Therefore, one has
all the ingredients to perform a game-theoretical study of
a gossip-based dissemination protocol secured with
LiFTinG.
Although performing a complete study is out of the
scope of this paper, we consider a simple utility function
to characterize the behavior of the freeriders when LiFTinG
is used. We deﬁne the utility of a node as the beneﬁt of
seeing the stream, minus its contribution in terms of the
devoted upload bandwidth. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that any node in the system (i.e., not expelled)
can see the stream, and in this case the beneﬁt is B > 0
(0 otherwise). For an honest node, the cost of uploading
content to the other nodes is denoted by C > 0. For a
freerider, the cost is C  ð1 d1Þð1 d2Þð1 d3Þ and drops
to 0 if it is expelled from the system. The utility of a node
out of the system is therefore 0 and necessarily B > C,
otherwise nodes would gain nothing by joining the system.
We can now express the expected utility u of a freerider as
a function of its degree of freeriding D: If the freerider is
detected (which occurs with probability aðDÞ), its utility
drops to 0, otherwise (probability 1 aðDÞ) its utility is
the beneﬁt of seeing the stream (i.e., B) minus the cost
of (partially) uploading the stream, i.e.,
Cð1 d1Þð1 d2Þð1 d3Þ. That is:
uðDÞ¼aðDÞ0þð1aðDÞÞðBCð1d1Þð1d2Þð1d3ÞÞ
¼ ð1aðDÞÞðBCð1d1Þð1d2Þð1d3ÞÞ ð8Þ
As freeriders are utility-maximizing entity, they will
choose the value of D that maximizes u.
In Fig. 8, we also plot the freeriders’ utility to determine
their optimal strategy (i.e., their degree of freeriding) for
different values of the beneﬁt and of the cost (B=C). It can
be observed that for B=C ¼ 1:1 (i.e., the freeriders care
slightly more about the stream than about their upload
bandwidth) the utility is maximized for a degree of freerid-
ing around d ¼ 0:025, which corresponds to a gain (i.e., the
Fig. 9. Entropy distribution (experimental pdf) of the nodes’ histories
using a full membership.
Table 4
Overhead of veriﬁcations.
Direct veriﬁcations (messages) 0
Direct veriﬁcations (blames) OðM  f Þ For the veriﬁer
2
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however, the optimal strategy is to well-behave.
5.2. Entropy-based detection
For the sake of fairness and in order to prevent collud-
ing nodes from covering each other up, LiFTinG includes
an entropic check thus assessing the statistical validity of
the partner selection. To this end, the entropy H of the dis-
tribution of the inspected node’s former partners is com-
pared to a threshold c. The distribution of the entropy of
honest nodes’ histories depends on the peer sampling algo-
rithm used and the random numbers generator. It can be
estimated by simulations. Fig. 9(a) depicts the distribution
of entropy for a history of nhf ¼ 600 partners (nh ¼ 50 and
f ¼ 12) of a 10;000-node system using a full membership-
based partner selection. The observed entropy ranges from
9:11 to 9:21 for a maximum reachable value of
log2ðnhf Þ ¼ 9:23. Similarly, the entropy of the fan-in mul-
ti-set F0h, i.e., nodes that selected the inspected node as
partner, is depicted in Fig. 9(b). The observed entropy
ranges from 8:98 to 9:34.
With c ¼ 8:95 the probability of wrongfully expelling a
node during local auditing is negligible.
We now analytically determine to what extent a free-
rider can bias its partner selection without being detected
by local auditing, given a threshold c and a number of col-
luding nodes6 m0. Consider a freerider that biases partner
selection in order to favor colluding freeriders by choosing
a freerider as partner with probability pm and an honest
node with probability 1 pm. We seek the maximum value
of pm a freerider can use without being detected, function
of c andm0. Deﬁning the probability law of the partner selec-
tion among honest nodes (resp. colluding nodes) by X (resp.
by Y), the entropy of its fan-out is expressed as follows:
HðF hÞ ¼  pmlog2pm  ð1 pmÞlog2ð1 pmÞ þ pmHðXÞ
þ ð1 pmÞHðYÞ;
as X and Y are independent. This quantity is maximized
when X and Y are the uniform distribution. Therefore, to
maximize the entropy of its history, a freerider must
choose uniformly at random its partners in the chosen
class, i.e., honest or colluding. In this case, the entropy of
its history writes (for m0 < nhf ):
HðF hÞ ¼ pmlog2
pm
m0
 	
 ð1 pmÞlog2
1
nh  f

 
ð9Þ
Inverting numerically Formula (9), we deduce that for
c ¼ 8:95 a freerider colluding with 25 other nodes can
serve its colluding partners up to 15% of the time, without
being detected.
In some cases, the random selection of nodes can be
biased and therefore deviates from the uniform distribu-
tion. For instance, because inter-ISP trafﬁc is expensive,
ISPs sometime block peer-to-peer trafﬁc between their
own clients and clients of other ISPs [47,50]. Also, nodes6 Note that, as the length of a history is relatively small, we do not take
into account the number of nodes that join the system during this time
interval.might prefer to communicate with close nodes (with re-
spect to network distance) for improved latencies and per-
formance. Such optimizations are considered as freeriding
by LiFTinG and can make a node fail the statistical test,
thus leading to its expulsion from the system. Provided
that the size of the groups towards which the nodes bias
the selection are large enough (typically much larger than
the size of a coalition), LiFTinG can still distinguish be-
tween freeriders and honest nodes by relaxing the thresh-
old of the entropic test, at the expense of an increased
tolerance towards freeriders. This is achieved by calibrat-
ing the threshold as explained above with the typical size
of a group (i.e., the average number of nodes that are lo-
cated in the same country or that have the same ISP) in-
stead of the system size n.5.3. Communication costs
In this section, we evaluate the overhead caused by
LiFTinG on the content dissemination protocol. To this
end, we compute the maximum number of veriﬁcation
and blame messages sent by a node during one gossip
period. The overhead of the veriﬁcations is summarized
in Table 4. Note that we do not consider statistical veriﬁca-
tions in this section, as it does not imply a regular overhead
but only sporadic message exchanges.5.3.1. Direct veriﬁcation
Direct veriﬁcations do not require any exchange of
veriﬁcation messages as they consist only in comparing
the number of chunks requested by the veriﬁer to the
number of chunks it really received. However, direct
veriﬁcation can lead to the emission of f blames (to M
managers). The communication overhead caused by direct
veriﬁcations is therefore OðM  f Þ messages.Direct cross-check (messages) Oðpdccf Þ For the veriﬁer
Oðpdccf Þ for the inspected node
Oðpdccf 2Þ for the each witness
Direct cross-check (blames) Oðpdcc M  f Þ For the veriﬁer
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In order to check that the chunks it sent during the previ-
ous gossip period are further proposed, the veriﬁer polls the
f partners of its f partners with probability pdcc. Similarly, a
node is polled by pdcc  f 2 nodes per gossip period on average
and therefore sends pdcc  f 2 replies. Finally, a node sends the
list of its current partners to the f nodes (on average) that
served chunks to it in the last gossip period. In addition, as
a node inspects its f partners, direct cross-checking can lead
to the emission of a maximum of f blames (toMmanagers).
The communication overhead caused by direct cross-check-
ing is therefore Oðpdcc  f 2 þ pdcc M  f Þ messages. Setting
pdcc to 1=f the overhead is OðM þ f Þ.
The number of messages sent by LiFTinG is OðM  f Þ.
This has to be compared to the number of messages sent
by the three-phase gossip protocol itself, speciﬁcally
f ð2þ Rj jÞ – where R is the set of requested chunks, the
two additional messages are the proposal and the request.
The overhead of LiFTinG is even more negligible when tak-
ing into account the size of the chunks sent by a node,
which is several orders of magnitude larger than the veri-
ﬁcation and blame messages. Finally, as f  lnðnÞ, both the
three-phase protocol and LiFTinG scale with the number of
nodes. Finally, note that setting f to lnðnÞ in an infect-and-
die gossip protocol is sufﬁcient to ensure that the content
is successfully broadcast with high probability [31]. Thus,
both the three-phase protocol and LiFTinG scale with the
number of nodes.
5.3.3. A posteriori veriﬁcation and cross-checking
Assume that nodes verify the nodes they manage. Every
period of time, a node picks one such node and triggers a
veriﬁcation. The cost of obtaining/providing the inspected
node history is Oðnhf Þ (for the inspected node and for the
veriﬁer). For each entry in the history, the veriﬁer asks
for a conﬁrmation to the corresponding node (with a given
probability pc). This leads to a cost of Oðpcnhf Þ (for the ver-
iﬁer and for the polled nodes as they answer to pcnhf such
conﬁrmation requests on average, each with a unit cost).6. Evaluation and experimental results
We now evaluate LiFTinG on top of the gossip-based
streaming protocol described in [14], over the PlanetLab
testbed. We describe the experimental setup in Section 6.1.
We evaluate the performance of LiFTinG showing its small
overhead in Section 6.2 and its precision and speed at
detecting freeriders in Section 6.3.
6.1. Experimental setup
We deploy and execute LiFTinG on a 300 PlanetLab
node testbed, broadcasting a stream of 674 kbps in the
presence of 10% of freeriders. The freeriders (i) contact
only f^ ¼ 6 random partners (d1 ¼ 1=7), (ii) propose only
90% of what they receive (d2 ¼ 0:1) and ﬁnally (iii) serve
only 90% of what they are requested (d3 ¼ 0:1). The fan-
out of all nodes is set to 7 and the gossip period is set to
500 ms. The blaming architecture uses M ¼ 25 managers
for each node.6.2. Practical cost
We report on the overhead measurements of direct and
a posteriori veriﬁcations (including blame messages sent to
the managers) for different stream rates.
6.2.1. Direct veriﬁcations
Table 5 gives the bandwidth overhead of the direct ver-
iﬁcations of LiFTinG for three values of pcc. Note that the
overhead is not null when pcc ¼ 0 because acknowledg-
ment messages are always sent. Yet, we observe that the
overhead is negligible when pcc ¼ 0 (i.e., when the system
is healthy) and remains reasonable when pcc ¼ 1 (i.e., when
the system needs to be purged from freeriders).
6.2.2. A posteriori veriﬁcations
A history message contains nh entries. Each entry con-
sists of f nodes identiﬁers and the chunk IDs that were pro-
posed. Both the fan-out and fan-in histories are sent upon a
posteriori veriﬁcation.
Besides the entropic checks, a posteriori cross-checking
is performed on a subset of the fan-out or fan-in entries.
We measure the maximum overhead, that is when the
whole fan-out and fan-in histories are cross-checked. The
overhead incurred by a posteriori veriﬁcations in our exper-
imental setup (i.e., a history size nh ¼ 50, a gossip period of
500 ms, a fan-out of f ¼ 7 and a posteriori veriﬁcation per-
iod of h ¼ 25 s) is given in Table 5.
6.3. Experimental results
We executed LiFTinG with pcc ¼ 1 and pcc ¼ 0:5. Fig. 10
depicts the scores obtained after 25, 30 and 35 s when run-
ning direct veriﬁcations and cross-checking. The scores are
compensated as explained in the analysis, assuming a loss
rate of 4% (average value for UDP packets observed on
PlanetLab).
The two cumulative distribution functions, for honest
nodes and freeriders, are clearly separated. The threshold
for expelling freeriders is set to 9:75 (as speciﬁed in the
analysis). In Fig. 10(b) (pcc ¼ 1, after 30 s) the detection
mechanism expels 86% of the freeriders and 12% of the
honest nodes. In other words, after 30 s, 14% of freeriders
are not yet detected and 12% represent false positives that
mainly correspond to honest nodes that suffer from very
poor connection (e.g., limited connectivity, message losses
and bandwidth limitation). These nodes do not deliber-
ately freeride, but their connection does not allow them
to contribute their fair share. This is acceptable as such
nodes should not have been allowed to join the system
in the ﬁrst place. As expected, with pcc set to 0:5 the detec-
tion is slower but not twice as slow. Effectively, with nodes
freeriding with d3 > 0 (i.e., partial serves) the direct check-
ing blames freeriders without the need for any cross-
checking. This explains why the detection after only 35 s
with pcc ¼ 0:5 (Fig. 10(f)) is comparable with the detection
after 30 s with pcc ¼ 1 (Fig. 10(b)).
Due to the dynamic nature of live streaming, being able
to expel freeriders after less than 1 min allows us to dras-
tically reduce their viewing experience. Indeed, because of
LiFTinG’s exclusion mechanism, a freerider will experience
Table 5
Practical bandwidth overhead.
Direct A posteriori
(%)
pcc ¼ 0
(%)
pcc ¼ 0:5
(%)
pcc ¼ 1
(%)
674 kbps 1:07 4:53 8:01 3:60
1082 kbps 0:69 3:51 5:04 2:89
2036 kbps 0:38 2:80 2:76 1:74
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tem, during the viewing. The duration of such pauses is in-
creased by the fact that the freerider needs to change its
identiﬁer (e.g., its IP) to be able to rejoin the system and
by the bootstrapping time inherent to the dissemination
protocol (e.g., buffering time, delay before the node’s ID
is available to the node selection). Hence, running a poster-
iory veriﬁcation every fewminutes on average is enough to
signiﬁcantly degrade the freeriders’s experience. For the
same reasons, whitewashing (i.e., leaving and joining the
system with a fresh identiﬁer to reset its score) is not a via-
ble solution for freeriders.
As stated in the analysis, we observe that the gap be-
tween the two cumulative distribution functions widens
over time. However, the variance of the score does not de-
crease (for both honest nodes and freeriders). This is be-
cause, in the analysis, we considered that the blames
applied to a given node during distinct gossip periods were
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). In practice
however, successive gossip periods are correlated. Indeed,
a node with a poor connection is usually blamedmore than
nodes with high capabilities, and this remains true over the
whole experiment.Fig. 10. Scores CDF for honest nodes and freeriders, wi7. Related work
TfT distributed incentives have been broadly used to
deal with freeriders in ﬁle sharing systems based on sym-
metric exchanges, such as BitTorrent [10]. However, there
are a number of attacks, mainly targeting the opportunistic
unchoking mechanism (i.e., asymmetric push), allowing
freeriders to download contents with no or a very small
contribution [38,51,45]. Many other incentive schemes
have been proposed, in particular for mesh overlays (e.g.,
reputation-based [42,49,41,29]) or trees (e.g., [57], mar-
ket-based [44], payment-based [53]) systems. However,
most of them either rely on a central authority to maintain
reputation or consider static overlays for easier auditing
and real-time veriﬁcations. In [46], the authors propose
OneHop reputations, a system in which peers rely on the
peers they interacted with in the past to assess the reputa-
tion of the peers they could interact with: if a peer p never
interacted with p0 in the past, it looks for a peer p00 that
interacted with it (i.e., p) and with p0 in the past, and asks
p00 about the reputation of p0. However, while such a peer
can be found most of the times in small swarms in which
peers collaborate with many other peers and keep track
of all their previous interactions, this might not be the case
for large-scale epidemic systems with hard scalability
constraints. In [28,29], the author propose EigenTrust, a
distributed algorithm for reputation management in
peer-to-peer networks, based on the number of
satisfactory/unsatisfactory pairwise interactions. The
authors also propose a (secure) distributed version of Eig-
enTrust that relies, similarly to LiFTinG, on the peers to act
as score managers (for each other) for aggregating,th pcc ¼ 1 (top row) and pcc ¼ 0:5 (bottom row).
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The focus and the contribution of EigenTrust are dual to
those of LiFTinG: EigenTrust relies on basic input from
the peers (i.e., generic binary input that represents
whether an interaction was satisfactory) and proposes a
complex aggregation and management scheme for reputa-
tion scores; LiFTinG however, relies on ﬁne-grained input
from the peers (i.e., blames, tightly related to the dissemi-
nation protocol, with integer values that reﬂect the seri-
ousness of the deviation–which is one of the main
contributions) and makes use of a simple aggregation
scheme (i.e., sum of the blame values). Note also that Eig-
enTrust can raise scalability issues in the context of epi-
demic dissemination as it involves computations on the
scores given by all the peers that interacted with a given
peer.
FlightPath (built on top of BAR Gossip) [36] is a gossip-
based streaming application that ﬁghts against freeriding
by using veriﬁcations on partner selection and chunk
exchanges. FlightPath operates in a gossip fashion for
partner selection and is composed of opportunistic pushes
performed by altruistic nodes (essential for the efﬁciency
of the protocol) and balanced pairwise exchanges secured
by TfT. The randomness of partner selection is veriﬁed by
means of a pseudo-random number generator with signed
seeds, and symmetric exchanges are made robust by using
cryptographic primitives. FlightPath prevents attacks on
opportunistic pushes by turning them into symmetric ex-
changes: each peer must reciprocate with junk chunks
when opportunistically unchoked. This results in a non-
negligible waste of bandwidth. It is further demonstrated
in [22] that BAR Gossip presents scalability issues, not to
mention the overhead of cryptography.
PeerReview [20] deals with malicious nodes following
an accountability approach. Peers maintain signed logs of
their actions that can be checked by using a reference
implementation running in addition to the application.
When combined with CSAR [4], PeerReview can be applied
to non-deterministic protocols. However, the intensive use
of cryptography and the sizes of the logs maintained and
exchanged drastically reduce the scalability of this solu-
tion. In addition, the validity of PeerReview relies on the
fact that messages are always received, which is not the
case over the Internet.
The case of malicious participants is considered in the
context of generic gossip protocols, i.e., consisting of state
exchanges and updates [26]. This system relies on cryptog-
raphy for signing messages between peers and does not
consider malicious behaviors that stem from the partner
selection, i.e., biasing the random choices. In addition, they
do not tackle the problem of collusion.
The two approaches that relate the most to LiFTinG are
the distributed auditing protocol proposed in [22] and the
passive monitoring protocol proposed in [30]. In the ﬁrst
protocol, freeriders are detected by cross-checking their
neighbors’ reports. The latter focuses on gossip-based
search in the Gnutella network. The peers monitor the
way their neighbors forward/answer queries in order to
detect freeriders and query droppers. In [8], the authors
propose a protocol to detect and exclude freeriders in the
CAN peer-to-peer data structure by monitoring how peersforward and answer routing messages. Yet, contrarily to
LiFTinG – which is based on random peer selection – in
both protocols the peers’s neighborhoods are static, form-
ing a ﬁxed mesh overlay. These techniques thus cannot
be applied to gossip protocols. In addition, the situation
where colluding peers cover each other up (not addressed
in the papers) makes such monitoring protocols vain.
In [2], the authors study the impact of measures against
the peers, such as the exclusion of peers, on several met-
rics, including the extinction time of the shared ﬁle, in epi-
demic dissemination systems. The results of this work can
be used to evaluate the efﬁcacy of LiFTinG in terms of its
effect on the global performance of the system.8. Conclusions
We have presented LiFTinG, a protocol for tracking free-
riders in gossip-based asymmetric data dissemination sys-
tems. Beyond the fact that LiFTinG deals with the inherent
randomness of the protocol, LiFTinG precisely relies on this
randomness to robustify, with very low overhead, its
veriﬁcation mechanisms against colluding freeriders. We
provided a theoretical analysis of LiFTinG that enables
the system designers to set its parameters to their optimal
values and characterizes its performance backed up by
extensive simulations. We reported on our PlanetLab
experimentation, that demonstrates the practicability and
efﬁciency of LiFTinG.
We believe that, beyond gossip protocols, LiFTinG can
be used to secure the asymmetric component of TfT-based
protocols, namely opportunistic unchoking, which is consid-
ered to constitute their Achilles’ heel [38,51]. We can also
envision a scheme in which peers are rewarded (by
increasing their scores) when they altruistically push
chunks to other peers, even after completing the download
(i.e., seeding, for P2P ﬁle download systems). As future
work, we intend to model a content-dissemination system
secured by LiFTinG as a game and study the strategies of
freeriders and the possible equilibria.References
[1] E. Adar, B. Huberman, Free riding on Gnutella, First Monday 5 (2000).
[2] E. Altman, P. Nain, A. Shwartz, Y. Xu, Predicting the impact of
measures against P2P networks on the transient behaviors, in:
INFOCOM’11: Proc. of the 30th IEEE Conference on Computer
Communications, pp. 1440–1448, doi: 10.1109/
INFCOM.2011.5934931.
[3] F. Azzedin, Trust-based taxonomy for free riders in distributed
multimedia systems, in: HPCS’10: Proc. of the 2010 International
Conference on High Performance Computing and Simulation, pp.
362–369, doi: 10.1109/HPCS.2010.5547108.
[4] M. Backes, P. Druschel, A. Haeberlen, D. Unruh, CSAR: a practical and
provable technique to make randomized systems accountable, in:
NDSS’09: Proc. of the 16th Annual Network & Distributed System
Security Symposium, pp. 341–353.
[5] T. Bonald, L. Massoulié, F. Mathieu, D. Perino, A. Twigg, Epidemic live
streaming: optimal performance trade-offs, in: SIGMETRICS’08: Proc.
of the 2008 ACM SIGMETRICS International Conference on
Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems, pp. 325–336,
doi: 10.1145/1375457.1375494.
[6] E. Bortnikov, M. Gurevich, I. Keidar, G. Kliot, A. Shraer, Brahms:
byzantine resilient random membership sampling, Comput.
Networks 53 (2009) 2340–2359, http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/
1400751.1400772.
R. Guerraoui et al. / Computer Networks 64 (2014) 322–338 337[7] S. Buchegger, J.Y. Le Boudec, Coping with False Accusations in
Misbehavior Reputation Systems for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks,
Technical Report, EPFL, 2003, <http://infoscience.epﬂ.ch/record/
467>.
[8] E. Buchmann, K. Böhm, FairNet: how to counter free riding in peer-
to-peer data structures, in: CoopIS’04: Proc. of the 2004 International
Conference on Cooperative Information Systems, pp. 337–354, doi:
10.1007/978-3-540-30468-5_22.
[9] K.H. Chan, S.H. Chan, A. Begen, SPANC: optimizing scheduling delay
for peer-to-peer live streaming, IEEE Trans. Multimedia 12 (2010)
743–753, http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TMM.2010.2053524.
[10] B. Cohen, Incentives build robustness in BitTorrent, in: P2PEcon’03:
Proc. of the 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, pp.
1–5.
[11] T. Cover, J. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory, John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1991.
[12] M. Deshpande, B. Xing, I. Lazardis, B. Hore, N. Venkatasubramanian,
S. Mehrotra, CREW: a gossip-based ﬂash-dissemination system, in:
ICDCS’06: Proc of the 26th IEEE International Conference on
Distributed Computing Systems, pp. 45–45, doi: 10.1109/
ICDCS.2006.24.
[13] P.T. Eugster, R. Guerraoui, S.B. Handurukande, P. Kouznetsov, A.M.
Kermarrec, Lightweight probabilistic broadcast, ACM Trans. Comput.
Syst. 21 (2003) 341–374, http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/945506.945507.
[14] D. Frey, R. Guerraoui, A.M. Kermarrec, M. Monod, V. Quéma,
Stretching gossip with live streaming, in: DSN’09: Proc. of the
2009 IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and
Networks, pp. 259–264, doi: 10.1109/DSN.2009.5270330.
[15] D. Frey, R. Guerraoui, B. Koldehofe, A.M. Kermarrec, M. Mogensen, M.
Monod, V. Quéma, Heterogeneous gossiping, in: Middleware’09:
Proc. of the ACM/IFIP/USENIX 10th International Middleware
Conference, pp. 42–61, doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-10445-9_3.
[16] A. Ganesh, A.M. Kermarrec, L. Massoulié, SCAMP: peer-to-peer
lightweight membership service for large-scale group
communication, in: NGC’01: Proc. of the 3rd International
Workshop on Networked Group Communication, pp. 44–55, doi:
10.1007/3-540-45546-9_4.
[17] J. Gerard, H. Cai, J. Wang, Alliatrust: a trustable reputation
management scheme for unstructured P2P systems, in: GPC’06:
Proc. of the 1st International Conference on Advances in Grid and
Pervasive Computing, pp. 115–125, doi: 10.1007/11745693_12.
[18] C. Gkantsidis, P. Rodriguez, Network coding for large-scale content
distribution, in: INFOCOM’05: Proc. of the 24th IEEE Conference on
Computer Communications, pp. 2235–2245, doi: 10.1109/
INFCOM.2005.1498511.
[19] R. Guerraoui, K. Huguenin, A.M. Kermarrec, M. Monod, S. Prusty,
LiFTinG: lightweight freerider-tracking protocol in gossip, in:
Middleware’10: Proc. of the ACM/IFIP/USENIX 11th International
Middleware Conference, pp. 313–333, doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-
16955-7_16.
[20] A. Haeberlen, P. Kouznetsov, P. Druschel, PeerReview: practical
accountability for distributed systems, in: SOSP’07: Proc. of 21st
ACM SIGOPS Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, pp. 175–
188, doi: 10.1145/1323293.1294279.
[21] G. Hardin, The tragedy of the commons, Science 162 (1968) 1243–
1248, http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.162.3859.1243.
[22] M. Haridasan, I. Jansch-Porto, R. Van Renesse, Enforcing fairness in a
live-streaming system, in: MMCN’08: Proc. of the 2008 Conference
on Multimedia Computing and Networking, pp. 1–13, doi: 10.1117/
12.775127.
[23] T. Ho, M. Mdard, R. Koetter, D. Karger, M. Effros, J. Shi, B. Leong, A
random linear network coding approach to multicast, IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory 52 (2006) 4413–4430, http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/
TIT.2006.881746.
[24] K. Hoffman, D. Zage, C. Nita-Rotaru, A survey of attack and defense
techniques for reputation systems, ACM Comput. Surv. 42 (2009) 1–
31, http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1592451.1592452.
[25] D. Hughes, G. Coulson, J. Walkerdine, Free riding on gnutella
revisited: the bell tolls?, IEEE Distrib Syst. Online 6 (2005) 1–18,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MDSO.2005.31.
[26] M. Jelasity, A. Montresor, O. Babaoglu, Detection and removal of
malicious peers in gossip-based protocols, in: FuDiCo’04: Proc. of the
2nd Workshop on Future Directions in Distributed Computing, pp.
1–4.
[27] M. Jelasity, S. Voulgaris, R. Guerraoui, A.M. Kermarrec, M. van Steen,
Gossip-based peer sampling, ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 25 (2007) 1–
36, http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1275517.1275520.
[28] S.D. Kamvar, M.T. Schlosser, H. Garcia-Molina, Incentives for
combatting freeriding on P2P networks, in: Euro-Par’03: Proc. ofthe 9th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed
Computing, pp. 1273–1279, doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-45209-6_171.
[29] S.D. Kamvar, M.T. Schlosser, H. Garcia-Molina, The eigentrust
algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks, in:
WWW’03: Proc. of the 12th International Conference on the World
Wide Web, pp. 640–651, doi: 10.1145/775152.775242.
[30] M. Karakaya, I. Körpeog˘lu, O. Ulusoy, Counteracting free-riding in
peer-to-peer networks, Comput. Networks 52 (2008) 675–694,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2007.11.002.
[31] A.M. Kermarrec, L. Massoulié, A. Ganesh, Probabilistic reliable
dissemination in large-scale systems, IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib.
Syst. 14 (2003) 248–258, http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/
TPDS.2003.1189583.
[32] A.M. Kermarrec, A. Pace, V. Quéma, V. Schiavoni, NAT-resilient
gossip peer sampling, in: ICDCS’09: Proc. of the 29th IEEE
International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pp.
360–367, doi: 10.1109/ICDCS.2009.44.
[33] V. King, J. Saia, Choosing a random peer, in: PODC’04: Proc. of the
23rd Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed
Computing, pp. 125–130, doi: 10.1145/1011767.1011786.
[34] R. Krishnan, M. Smith, Z. Tang, R. Telang, The impact of free-riding on
peer-to-peer networks, in: HICSS’04: Proc. of the 37th Annual
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, pp. 1–10,
doi: 10.1109/HICSS.2004.1265472.
[35] B. Li, Y. Qu, Y. Keung, S. Xie, C. Lin, J. Liu, X. Zhang, Inside the new
coolstreaming: principles, measurements and performance
implications, in: INFOCOM’08: Proc. of the 27th IEEE Conference
on Computer Communications, pp. 1031–1039, doi: 10.1109/
INFOCOM.2008.157.
[36] H. Li, A. Clement, M. Marchetti, M. Kapritsos, L. Robinson, L. Alvisi, M.
Dahlin, FlightPath: obedience vs choice in cooperative services, in:
OSDI’08: Proc. of the 8th USENIX Conference on Operating Systems
Design and Implementation, pp. 355–368.
[37] Q. Lian, Z. Zhang, M. Yang, B.Y. Zhao, Y. Dai, X. Li, An empirical study
of collusion behavior in the maze P2P ﬁle-sharing system, in:
ICDCS’07: Proc of the 27th IEEE International Conference on
Distributed Computing Systems, p. 56, doi: 10.1109/ICDCS.2007.84.
[38] T. Locher, P. Moor, S. Schmid, R. Wattenhofer, Free riding in
bittorrent is cheap, in: HotNets-V: Proc. of the 5th Workshop on
Hot Topics in Networks, 2006, pp. 85–90.
[39] N. Magharei, R. Rejaie, PRIME: peer-to-peer receiver-driven mesh-
based streaming, IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking 17 (2009) 1052–
1065, http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2008.2007434.
[40] S. Marti, H. Garcia-Molina, Taxonomy of trust: categorizing P2P
reputation systems, Comput. Networks 50 (2006) 472–484.
j.comnet.2005.07.011.
[41] M. Meulpolder, J. Pouwelse, D. Epema, H. Sips, BarterCast: a practical
approach to prevent lazy freeriding in P2P networks, in: IPDPS’09:
Proc. of the IEEE International Symposium on Parallel & Distributed
Processing, pp. 1–8, doi: 10.1109/IPDPS.2009.5160954.
[42] A. Montazeri, B. Akbari, Mesh-based P2P video streaming with a
distributed incentive mechanism, in: ICOIN’11: Proc. of the 2011
International Conference on Information Networking, pp. 108–113,
doi: 10.1109/ICOIN.2011.5723143.
[43] R. Morales, I. Gupta, AVMON: optimal and scalable discovery of
consistent availability monitoring overlays for distributed systems,
IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst. 20 (2009) 446–459, http://
dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPDS.2008.84.
[44] A. Payberah, F. Rahimian, S. Haridi, J. Dowling, Sepidar: incentivized
market-based P2P live-streaming on the gradient overlay network,
in: ISM’10: Proc. of the 2010 IEEE International Symposium on
Multimedia, pp. 1–8, doi: 10.1109/ISM.2010.11.
[45] M. Piatek, T. Isdal, T. Anderson, A. Krishnamurthy, A. Venkataramani,
Do incentives build robustness in BitTorrent?, in: NSDI’07: Proc. of
the 4th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and
Implementation, pp. 1–14.
[46] M. Piatek, T. Isdal, A. Krishnamurthy, T. Anderson, One hop
reputations for peer to peer ﬁle sharing workloads, in: NSDI’08:
Proc. of the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design
and Implementation, pp. 1–14.
[47] F. Picconi, L. Massoulie, ISP friend or foe? Making P2P live streaming
ISP-aware, in: ICDCS’09: Proc of the 29th IEEE International
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pp. 413–422, doi:
10.1109/ICDCS.2009.37.
[48] J. Rosenberg, R. Mahy, P. Matthews, D. Wing, Session Traversal
Utilities for NATs (STUN), Technical Report RFC 5389, IETF, 2008.
[49] A. Satsiou, L. Tassiulas, Reputation-based resource allocation in P2P
systems of rational users, IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst. 21 (2010)
466–479, http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPDS.2009.80.
338 R. Guerraoui et al. / Computer Networks 64 (2014) 322–338[50] Z. Shen, R. Zimmermann, ISP-friendly P2P live streaming: a roadmap
to realization, ACM Trans. Multimedia Comput. Commun. Appl. 8
(2012) 11:1–11:20, http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2089085.2089088.
[51] M. Sirivianos, J. Park, R. Chen, X. Yang, Free-riding in BitTorrent with
the large view exploit, in: IPTPS’07: Proc. of the 6th International
Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, pp. 1–6.
[52] M.A. Stephens, EDF statistics for goodness of ﬁt and some
comparisons, J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 69 (1974) 730–737.
[53] G. Tan, S.A. Jarvis, A payment-based incentive and service
differentiation scheme for peer-to-peer streaming broadcast, IEEE
Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst. 19 (2008) 940–953, http://dx.doi.org/
10.1109/TPDS.2007.70778.
[54] D.N. Tran, B. Min, J. Li, L. Subramanian, Sybil-resilient online content
voting, in: NSDI’09: Proc. of the 6th USENIX Symposium on
Networked Systems Design and Implementation, pp. 15–28.
[55] V. Venkataraman, K. Yoshida, P. Francis, Chunkyspread:
heterogeneous unstructured tree-based peer-to-peer multicast, in:
ICNP’06: Proc. of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Network
Protocols, pp. 2–11, doi: 10.1109/ICNP.2006.320193.
[56] M. Wang, B. Li, R2: random push with random network coding in
live peer-to-peer streaming, IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 25 (2007)
1655–1666, http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2007.071205.
[57] S. Yang, X. Wang, An incentive mechanism for tree-based live media
streaming service, J. Networks 5 (2010) 57–64.
[58] N. Zeilemaker, M. Capota˘, A. Bakker, J. Pouwelse, Tribler: P2P media
search and sharing, in: MM’11: Proc. of the 19th ACM International
Conference on Multimedia, pp. 739–742, doi: 10.1145/
2072298.2072433.
[59] M. Zhang, Q. Zhang, L. Sun, S. Yang, Understanding the power of pull-
based streaming protocol: can we do better?, IEEE J Sel. Areas
Commun. 25 (2007) 1678–1694, http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/
JSAC.2007.071207.
[60] X. Zhang, H. Hassanein, A survey of peer-to-peer live video
streaming schemes - an algorithmic perspective, Comput.
Networks 56 (2012) 3548–3579, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.comnet.2012.06.013.
Rachid Guerraoui is a Professor of computer
science at the school of computer and com-
munication sciences of the École Polytech-
nique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL),
Switzerland, where he leads the Distributed
Programming Laboratory. Prior to that, Rachid
has been afﬁliated respectively with the Cen-
tre de Recherche de l’Ecole des Mines de Paris,
the Commissariat á l’Energie Atomique Paris,
HP Labs Palo Alto and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.Kévin Huguenin is a Post-Doctoral
Researcher at École Polytechnique Fédérale de
Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland, in the Labora-
tory for Communications and Applications. He
earned his M.Sc. from Ecole Normale Supéri-
eure (ENS) de Cachan and the Université de
Nice – Sophia Antipolis, France, in 2007 and
his Ph.D. in computer science from the Uni-
versité of Rennes, France, in 2010. His
research interests include security and pri-
vacy in networks and distributed systems.Anne-Marie Kermarrec is a Senior
Researcher at INRIA, Rennes, France, where
she leads the ASAP research group. Her
research interests are in peer-to-peer net-
works, large-scale information management,
epidemic protocols and social networks.
Before that, Anne-Marie was with Microsoft
Research in Cambridge. She earned her Ph.D.
from the Université de Rennes, France, in
1996. She has been awarded a European
Research Council Starting Grant for her ﬁve-
year GOSSPLE project.Maxime Monod is a Chief Technology Ofﬁcer
(CTO) at Klewel, Switzerland, where he works
on an advanced webcasting solution, both for
live and on-demand, by capturing, indexing
and broadcasting events such as conferences
and lectures. He received his M.Sc. and his
Ph.D. in computer science from École Poly-
technique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Swit-
zerland, in 2004 and 2010. His research
interests include gossip protocols, peer-to-
peer architectures and live streaming in large-
scale distributed systems.Swagatika Prusty is graduate student work-
ing for her Ph.D. in computer science in the
Center for Forensics and Society at the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts Amherst. She earned
her B.Sc. in computer science and engineering
from the India Institute of Technology,
Guwahati, India. She worked as an intern at
Nokia Research Center Cambridge in 2011 and
at École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
(EPFL), Switzerland in 2009 The primary focus
of her research is on digital forensics and
analyzing security and privacy aspects of real-
world systems.Aline Roumy is a researcher at INRIA, Rennes,
France in the SIROCCO research group. She
earned her Engineering degree from the École
Nationale Supérieure de l’Électronique et de
ses Applications, Cergy, France, in 1996, and
her M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees from the Univer-
sité de Cergy-Pontoise, France, in 1997 and
2000, respectively. From 2000 to 2001, she
was a Research Associate with Princeton
University, Princeton, NJ. She joined INRIA in
November 2001 as a researcher. Her current
research interests include statistical signal
processing, coding theory, and information theory.
